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THE OWNER'S INTENT AND THE NEGOTIABILITY OF
CHATTELS: A CRITIQUE OF SECTION 2-403 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WHERE an owner of chattels has lost them against his will and then finds
them in the hands of a good faith purchaser, the law often appears arbitrary in
favoring one claimant over another. In dealing with this situation, as with
many others, sales law has focussed upon the semi-mystical concept of "title"
in the chattels; only where title passed could the good faith purchaser keep the
chattel, and the occasions for passage of title were primarily dependent on the
"intent" of the original owner in his dealings. Through the use of two related
doctrines-cash sale and larceny by a trick-the "intent" of the owner entering
a sales transaction was permitted to defeat the good faith purchaser's claim.
When the original owner had been deceived as to the identity of his purchaser,
the courts could say that the chattel had been taken through a larceny by a
trick and therefore no title passed to the fraudulent purchaser.' When the orig-
inal owner demanded full cash payment before delivering possession to his pur-
chaser, and received a worthless check, the courts could view the transaction as
a technical cash sale so that no title passed to the purchaser.
2
The use of these doctrines to protect the original owner was frequently
criticized 3 to permit the owner's intent to dictate the decision appeared to
ignore the rights of the good faith purchaser rather than to weigh them against
the owner's rights. This was regarded as unfair to the purchaser and harmful
to the commercial objective of fostering a free flow of goods.&4 Against this
background of criticism, the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code
stated that they were significantly altering the cash sale and larceny by a trick
doctrines. 5 Section 2-403(1) of the Code thus provides:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires
rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable
1. See notes 58-61 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
3. It is a hard case in which the court must decide which of two innocent men must
bear a loss, with only a probably fruitless claim against an absconder to fall back upon.
The courts have tried to make the decision turn upon a logical deduction, based upon
the fact that B [the original seller] has never assented to sell the goods to A [the
absconder]. ... It is not enough merely to say [this] .... The question of property
in the goods is not answered by the law of contracts or by the law of mistake.
3 CoRnn, CoNRAcrs § 601, at 617-18 (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Comnm].
4. See, e.g., Professor Lattini discussing the cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines:
Query, whether it would not be better policy to protect the bona fide purchaser and
thus give greater fluidity to sales of this type?
LArrN, CASES .-XD MAfX.s ox TnE' LAw Or SALEs 319 (1947).
5. UNmoa.n Com amu. CODE (1958 Official Text), § 2-403, Comment 2, at 126 [here-
inafter cited as U.C.C.].
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title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for
value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase
the purchaser has such power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dis-
honored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
6
It appears that 2-403 (1) contemplates results different from those effected
by the old doctrines. In disregarding whether the seller was in fact paid in a
technical cash sale, or whether he was deceived as to the identity of his
purchaser, the section seems substantially to change prior law by shifting
away from the intent of the original owner to the good faith of the ultimate
purchaser as the sole determinant of competing claims to the chattel in ques-
tion. This interpretation of the section is strengthened by considering the
effect of 2-403 (2) and (3). Under prior statutory law, termed Factors Acts,
an agent who was entrusted with chattels for the purpose of selling them could
convey indefeasible title to a good faith purchaser even though the agent sold
in breach of the owner's specific instructions; but where the fraudulent agent
had not been entrusted for the purposes of sale the original owner could retake
his chattels from a good faith purchaser.7 The Code broadens the entrusting
doctrine so that any delivery of chattels to a merchant who customarily sells
such chattels gives the fraudulent merchant power to pass indefeasible title to
a good faith purchaser ;8 the intent of the owner, which had been respected in
prior law, appears disregarded under this provision of the Code. But before we
construe section 2-403 as radically altering prior law, it is necessary to examine
the underlying rationale of the old doctrines, the extent to which other pro-
visions of the Code rely on this rationale, and the validity of the argument that
good faith purchasers of chattels should be more generally protected.
In searching for relevant guides, the folk version of legal realism-the "gut
response"--cannot help us with the hard case in deciding between the owner
and good faith purchaser. The self-evident solution is to penalize the party who
6. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1).
7. See Thacher v. Moors, 134 Mass. 156 (1883) ; Scollans v. Rollins, 179 Mass. 346, 60
N.E. 983 (1901) (Holmes, C.J.) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 317-23 (rev. ed. 1948) [herein-
after cited as WILLISTON] ; Waite, Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process, 25 COLUM. L.
REv. 129 (1925).
8. (2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of
that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of posses-
sion regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or
acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the pos-





has been negligent in dealing with the chattel.9 The old rules, if only by
virtue of their flexibility, permitted us to follow this instinct Thus the negli-
gent purchaser could be deemed to have taken the chattel with notice of the
owner's prior claim,' 0 and the negligent owner could be considered estopped
from pursuing his claim against the purchaser."' But these rules leave the pro-
totype case unsolved. Where a small, honest merchant, acting as carefully as he
can, sells to a cheat who in turn sells to a prudent widow who is housing
several orphans, with whom should we sympathize? Or when the position of
the parties is reversed, should we still manipulate our doctrines to favor the
widow? Natural sympathy gives us little guidance here, and the problem can
be solved only by taking a broader view of the commercial implications of de-
ciding one way or the other. The answer will almost inevitably depend on the
starting point; on whom do we fasten our attention, the original owner or the
good faith purchaser? Why should one be favored over the other?
The problem is not a new one. Classical Roman law gave an answer in-
variably favorable to the original owner. For the Romans, indefeasible owner-
ship could be transferred only by exacting ceremonies ;'- in no circumstances
could a mere bailee transfer title against the wishes of the true owner. 3 And
title did not pass from the owner in a sales transaction until the buyer had
both accepted delivery of the chattel and had paid the seller the full purchase
price.' 4 But the rigors of this latter rule were relaxed in later law, probably
by Justinian's compilers, so that title would pass upon delivery if the seller
had agreed to grant credit to the buyer.' 5 The original formulation of the
rule protected the seller against the consequences of his buyer's insolvency and
of his buyer's fraud in selling the chattel to a third party. In either case the
seller could retake the chattel. But the later rule, still dwelling on passage of
title as the essential determinant, permitted the ultimate purchaser in a credit
transaction to defeat the claim of the original credit seller.
The French Civil Code, although generally derived from Roman Law doc-
trine, radically departs from the rules protecting the original owner by favor-
ing the ultimate purchaser in virtually all situations. The language of "passage
9. The decision should go against [the original owner-seller] if the circumstances show
that he did not act with prudence. But the circumstances of the sale by [the fraudulent
purchaser] to the third person may show that the latter also acted imprudently ....
[T]he circumstances of each case should be weighed.
3 Cor § 601, at 618.
10. See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrite of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE LJ.
1057,1062 n.14 (1954).
11. See, e.g., Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317, 319 (D. Neb. 1950); White Y.
Pike, 240 Iowa 596, 36 N.W.2d 761 (1949) ; Parr v. Helfrich, 108 Neb. 801, 189 N.V. 281
(1922). See also, with reference to negotiable instruments, Abel, The Imposter Payee: or
Rhode Island Was Right, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 161,232.
12. BUCKI.AND & McNA, ROMAN LAW AND CoMmoN LAW 110-12 (2d ed. 1952).
13. Id. at 130.
14. INszrrurts 2.141. See DE ZULUETA, THE RomAN LAW OF SAu 37-38 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as DE ZuLJETA].
15. NicHOLAS, AN INTRODUcTION TO ROmAN LAW 179 (1962) (hereinafter cited as
NIcHOLAS].
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of title" as the key to the status of the good faith purchaser is discarded. Title
as such means nothing; "so far as moveables are concerned, possession is
equivalent to title."'0 There is one exception; where goods have been lost or
stolen, the original owner may retake them from a good faith purchaser within
a three-year limitation period.17 But the value of this protection is significantly
reduced by the further provision that where the lost or stolen chattels have
been purchased in good faith at a "fair, market, or public sale, or from a mer-
chant who sells goods of that description," the owner's claim to retake the
chattels is defeated ;1s thus, the owner's claim "is rendered worthless in most
cases .... "10 The effect of these provisions is that chattels can be freely trans-
ferred without reference to any underlying transaction concerning the claims of
others to the goods; possession itself is virtually conclusive evidence of the
right to possession. As Professor Lawson has said, "in French law all move-
ables are in effect negotiable.
20
Classical Roman law looks first to the interests of the original owner;
French law looks to the commercial purchaser. It is tempting to hypothesize
an inevitability to this development of legal doctrine, to describe the Roman
rules as characteristic of a static, non-commercial society where pre-existing
rights were valued above all else, and the French rules as expressing the
natural organization of a fluid commercial society. But the temptation should
be resisted. Rome, in classical times and later, was an intensely commercial
community, and Roman law was able to serve as the model for modern Civil
law because Roman law had been stretched and fitted in its own time to re-
markably modern commercial demands.21 Compared with the modern Civil
law and the Anglo-American Factors Acts 22 which permit a mercantile agent
entrusted with goods for the purpose of sale to pass title even if he sells in
breach of his authority, the rule that a bailee could not confer indefeasible
title on a good faith purchaser might appear to brand Roman law as non-
commercial. But what the common law terms bailments were in Rome loans
or leases,23 not sales transactions; and under the Uniform Commercial Code
a bailee who holds under a lease or loan cannot pass title to a good faith pur-
chaser.24 Moreover, Roman Law had its counterpart to our Factors Act. The
Roman mercantile agents (who were, for the most part, slaves with no in-
dependent legal status) conveyed and accepted chattels on behalf of their
16. CODE CIVIL art. 2279 (Fr. 53d ed. Dalloz 1954).
17. Ibid.
18. CODE CIVIL art. 2280 (Fr. 53d ed. Dalloz 1954).
19. DE ZULUETA at 256 n.
20. LAwsoN, A CoMMoN LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAWv 176 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as LAWSON].
21. See generally LAwsoN at 91-135.
22. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
23. See LAwsoN at 135-37.
24. See notes 28, 31-34 infra and accompanying text. This rule applies unless the
bailee is also a mefchaht'who deals in goods of that description. See V.C.C. § 2-403 (2),
(3), quoted in note 8 supra. But see note 53 infra.
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masters and these slaves were conclusively presumed to have their master's
authority to convey the chattels in the slaves' possession.2 5 In fact, this doc-
trine and others regarding the effects of cash sales as opposed to credit sales
and the ability of the seller in possession to pass indefeasible title to a sec-
ond purchaser show a striking similarity between Roman law and common
law, particularly American, sales doctrine.2 6 Therefore, unless we are willing
to assert that America and England have been less fluid and less commercial
than the Continental societies, we cannot conclude that the greater protection
given to the good faith purchaser in the Civil law is a necessary commercial
evolution.
It is dear that section 2-403 has given the good faith purchaser some
greater protection than he was afforded under prior sales law. But this does
not necessarily mean that the section has followed French law by shifting the
presumption to favor the good faith purchaser generally. Such a conclusion is
possible only if the essential inquiry in establishing the worth of the pur-
chaser's claim is directed to the circumstances under which the chattel came
to him. If the traditional common law and Roman law approach of looking
primarily to the manner in which the original owner parted with his chattel is
continued, it cannot be said that chattels have become inescapably negotiable
under the Uniform Commercial Code.
An examination of section 2-403 and the Code generally indicates that the
owner's intent remains the primary line of inquiry. First of all, the Code per-
mits the original owner always to reclaim his stolen chattels from a good faith
purchaser.27 In spite of the additional protection given a good faith purchaser
by 2-403 (2), the purchaser still cannot buy chattels from a merchant, as he can
in France, in full confidence that he has received an indefeasible right to keep
the chattels. The necessary implication of the treatment of stolen chattels is a
policy judgment that the chattels do not properly become a subject of com-
merce until the owner voluntarily parts with them. Thus the demands of
the commercial market reflected in French law that chattels be freely negoti-
able are sacrificed to the owner's right to hold onto his property.
This traditional line of inquiry is evident throughout the Code's treatment
of the good faith purchaser. The deceived or cheated owner is only deprived
of his claims if he disposes of the goods in a "transaction of purchase" ; if he
rents or lends his chattels to someone who fraudulently conveys them, the
owner may retake from the purchaser. And even the old entrusting for pur-
poses of sale doctrine is retained, although 2-403(2) has the appearance of
discarding it. Although it is true that any entrusting to a merchant carries
25. NICHO.AS at 70-71, 202.
26. Lawson, The Passing of Property and Risk in Sale of Goods, 65 L. Q. RE,. 352,
357 (1949).
27. Hertz Corp. v. Hardy, 197 Pa. Super. 466, 178 Al2d 833 (1962) ; Atlantic Finance
Co. v. Fisher, 173 Ohio St. 387, 183 N.E.2d 135 (1962); Superior Iron Works & Supply
Co. v. McMillan, 235 Ark. 207, 357 S.NV2d 524 (1962). See HAwy.LAND, SALE AND BULN
SALEs (UNDER THE UNIFORM Co ExMRcIA. CoDE) 105 (1958).
28. U.C.C. § 2-403 (1), quoted in text accompanying note 6 supra.
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with it the power to convey indefeasible title, entrusting to an agent who is
not also a merchant is not specifically treated. However, it is stated in the
comment to the section, which serves as a legislative gloss, that the Factors
Acts remain applicable to a non-merchant agent who is entrusted with goods."9
It would have been better draftsmanship to have included language saving the
Factors Acts in the section itself, as such language was placed in the 'Uniform
Sales Act.30 Nonetheless it would be extraordinary if that section's effect were
to deprive the good faith purchaser of protection he had under pre-existing
law, since the clear purpose of 2-403 is to extend the protection. Thus where
goods are sold by a non-merchant agent, contrary to the owner's instructions,
the courts must still ask whether the agent was given possession for the pur-
pose of selling the goods or for some other purpose; the answer to this ques-
tion decides the good faith purchaser's claim. What is the justification for this
policy? Though the comment appears to rely on the doctrine of apparent
authority as an explanation, that doctrine is of no assistance here; the owner's
private instructions to the agent would not alter the impression that third par-
ties might draw from the agent's possession of the chattels. The only justifica-
tion can be the policy, described in relation to stolen chattels, that the owner's
intent determines when chattels have become objects of commerce.
Furthermore, the whole present structure of secured consumer financing,
preserved though simplified by the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 would be un-
dermined by the French rule that possession of chattels is equivalent to title.
Credit sellers of consumer goods customarily enter "title-retaining" contracts
of sale; the purchaser-borrower takes possession, but the seller-financer retains
legal title so that he can retake from a good faith purchaser in case of a con-
veyance by the borrower.3 2 These transactions, characterized as "conditional
sales" and "chattel mortgages," are subject to registration in the majority of
states ;33 and thus, on their face, they do not appear to threaten good faith
purchasers. Regardless of whether these protections to consumer credit sellers'
can be justified,3 4 the point here is that the Code again, in transactions of great
commercial importance, permits the intent of the original owner in dealing
with the chattel to determine the rights of the good faith purchaser.
Section 2-403(2)-the provision abolishing the entrusting for purposes
of sale doctrine-itself appears much less of a break from the traditional coni-
mon law and statutory policy when viewed against the accumulated case law
29. ... the policy of this Act expressly providing for the application of supplementary
general principles of law to sales transactions wherever appropriate joins with the
present section to continue unimpaired all rights acquired under the law of agency
or of apparent agency or ownership or other estoppel . . . . The section also leaves
unimpaired the powers given to selling factors under the earlier Factors Acts.
U.C.C. § 2-403, comment 1, at 125. But see Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1059 n4.
30. UNIFoRm SAzs Act § 23 (2) (a) [hereinafter cited as U.S.A.].
31. See U.C.C. § 9-101, Comment at 587-90.
32. U.C.C. § 9-307 (2). See 2 WiLisToN § 324, at 266.
33. U.C.C. § 9-307(2) and comment 3, at 659. See 2 WnuxsToN § 327, at 276; Com-
ment, Recordation of Conditional Sales, 37 YALE L.J. 494 (1938).
34. See note 63 infra.
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on the entrusting doctrine. While this provision has a Gallic flavor, in that the
intent of the owner becomes irrelevant once the goods are delivered to a mer-
chant, the provision can as readily be seen as a desire to avoid the misuse of
the traditional entrusting doctrine than as a desire to discard the underly-
ing policy of that doctrine. The doctrine as applied to merchants was fre-
quently used to mask clear instances of mercantile agency.35 Jewelers would
send gems to other merchants "on approval" or "for inspection" and the
courts would refuse to see an entrusting for purposes of sale, so that the good
faith purchaser would lose.3 6 Similarly, a distinction was drawn between en-
trusting for sale, and entrusting for soliciting offers to buy subject to the
owner's approval; where the court saw the latter, again the good faith pur-
chaser would lose.3 7 These nice distinctions do not reflect the policy of the
old entrusting doctrine that good faith purchasers should be protected where
an agent for sale in fact sells in breach of his authority. Since a fair reading
of the owners' purposes in these cases is that they intended the merchants to
act as agents for sale, the courts were too narrow in their treatment of the
policy of the doctrine. The reasons why the owner's intent should be con-
strued in this way will become clearer when the notion of intent has itself been
analyzed.38 The point here is that 2-403 (2) may be viewed as a factual
presumption, albeit an irrebuttable one, that chattels are delivered to a mer-
chant by the owner with the intention that they be sold, such presumption
being derived from the kinds of litigation which have arisen from merchant
agents selling beyond their authority.
If this is a true reading of 2-403 (2)-and it is difficult to see the pro-
vision as based on a conviction that all chattels should be freely negotiable
since even a merchant cannot pass indefeasible title to stolen goods-then what
is the policy motivation of 2-403(1)? Have the cash sale and larceny by
a trick" doctrines been abandoned because the draftsmen believed that the
courts were obscuring the true intent of the owners in dealing with their chat-
tels? Ostensibly the Code relies on a species of estoppel as its justification
for 2-403(1) ; the comment to the 1949 draft states:
The problem underlying this entire section is one of good faith purchase
based on grounds which are a combination of reasonable appearance and
such action or acquiescence by an original claimant as will justify holding
him to answer for those appearances. Delivery of goods under what the
original claimant himself believed to be a contract for sale affords such
grounds.3 9
35. It may be thought courts have gone to an extreme in protecting the principal from
the consequences of slight variations by the agent from the authority granted him.
2 WILLISTON § 317, at 255.
36. See Note, Innocent Purchasers and Jeuwelers' Memoranda, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rsv.
115 (1934).
37. See2 W sToN §§313-14.
38. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
39. UNIso-M CoMMERCUL. CODE (May 1949 Draft) § 2-405, Comment 5, at 136. This
Section is a prior version of § 2-403.
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The policy motivation of the section is not readily apparent from this state-
ment. Why should the Code refuse to see distinctions between different kinds
of sales contracts? Given that the owner's intent remains under the Code the
crucial inquiry in assessing the good faith purchaser's claim, we must ascertain
what kind of "intent" the courts discerned in differentiating between the ef-
fects of various dealings with chattels before we can determine whether the
Code would be justified in treating all contracts of sale as embodying the
same intent of the owner.
The standards by which courts arrived at an owner's intent which had the
effect of sacrificing his claim to a good faith purchaser are revealed in the com-
mon law treatment of negotiable bills of lading-the one area of American law
where it can be unequivocally stated that chattels through documents become
fully negotiable in the French sense.40 The present structure of American law
regarding such bills is this. Where chattels are delivered to a carrier by some-
one who has power to convey title to a good faith purchaser, the carrier can
issue a negotiable bill describing the chattels to be shipped, and the carrier
thereby assumes an obligation to deliver the chattels at destination only to the
holder of the bill. The bill may then be endorsed by the original shipper to a
bank which thereby acquires an indefeasible claim to the chattels. The ultimate
purchaser of the chattels at destination can only claim them by purchasing the
bill of lading from the bank or its endorsee. Any set-off the purchaser may
have against the original shipper, whether from a prior transaction or from
breach of some warranty concerning the chattels, is irrelevant to the pur-
chaser's ability to get the bill of lading from the endorsee; the purchaser must
pay full value for the bill or he will not get the chattels. And any holder of
the bill has an indefeasible claim to the chattels; it does not matter whether the
holder acquired the bill from someone who had stolen or found it, so long
as the holder took the bill "in the due course" of trade.41 Thus, regarding
negotiable bills of lading, the maxim of Article 2279 of the Civil Code that
"possession is equivalent to title" applies.
42
40. [American law] has made a most valuable distinction, almost unknown to English
law, between negotiable and non-negotiable documents of title, and, whilst conferring
no power on the holder of the latter to pass a better title than he himself has.
gives full security to the holder in due course of a document of the former class. in
other words, the Uniform Sales Act substitutes for the negotiable goods of French
law negotiable documents of title to goods.
Lawson, supra note 26, at 355.
See also Gilmore, On The Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALn L.J.
1341,1346 (1948).
41. This is, essentially, that the holder was a good faith purchaser for value; but the
standards applied are less rigorous with negotiable instruments than with chattels. See
Abel, supra note 11, at 223-24. But see 3 WILLiSTOx § 621.
42. See UNIFORM BILLS OF LADING ACT §§ 31, 38; FEDMAL BILLS OF LADING ACT
§§ 30, 37, 39 Stat. 543-44 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §§ 111, 117 (1958). See also 2 WILLISTON §
414; Britton, Negotiable Documents of Title, 5 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 112-17 (1954) ; Vold,
Documents of Title as Security Devices in Sales, 11 B.U.L. REv. 195 (1931).
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The relevant question here is why such bills ever became negotiable. In
form they are simply the embodiment of a contract between the shipper of
goods and the carrier concerning the disposition of goods at their destination.
Why was our law willing to permit the thief of a bill of lading to pass inde-
feasible title when it would not permit the thief of the chattels themselves to
pass such title? The answer can be seen in juxtaposing the reasoning of an
eighteenth and a nineteenth century English case, the first denying negotiabil-
ity, the second granting negotiability to instruments equivalent to bills of lad-
ing. The first case is Lickbarrow v. Mason 43 where Lord Loughborough stated:
Bills of lading differ essentially from [negotiable] bills of exchange ...
[which] can only be used for the one purpose, namely, to extend credit
by a speedy transfer of the debt which one person owes to another to a
third person. Bills of lading may be assigned for as many different pur-
poses as goods may be delivered. They may be indorsed by the true owner
of the goods, by the freighter who acts merely as his servant; they may
be indorsed to a factor to sell for the owner; they may be indorsed by the
seller of the goods to the buyer; ... To such an instrument so various in
its uses it seems impossible to apply the same rules as govern the in-
dorsement of bills of exchange.
44
This holding was later reversed in a per curiam opinion by the House of
Lords and subsequent trial de novo, though the grounds for reversal are un-
clear.45 But the rationale for holding such bills negotiable was later stated in
Merchant Banking Co. v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co. In that case, involving
a document which was essentially a bill of lading, that is, which unconditionally
promised to deliver merchandise to the payee or indorsee of the bill, Jessel,
M.R., stated:
Is it rational to impute any other purpose than really the very purpose
that [the document] was given [by the seller of the goods to the now
insolvent purchaser] . . . namely, the purpose of pledging or selling; as
I have no doubt it was?... mad, of course, if you give a person a docu-
ment knowing he can use it in a particular way, and intending he shall
use it in that particular way by obtaining money on it, you cannot after-
wards be allowed to say, as against persons from whom he has obtained
money, that the person is not to have the benefit thereof? That, it seems
to me, would be contrary to the most elementary principles of equity.. 41
The court thus held as a matter of principle, and because of the general cus-
tom in the trade,47 that the document was negotiable and that the holder in
due course could claim the merchandise even though the original seller could
not collect the purchase price from its purchaser. The bill was negotiable be-
cause it was the "dominant intent" of the original owner of the chattels that it
be negotiable. Of course the owner did not intend to lose his purchase price.
He did, however, intend that the purchaser use the document to obtain money
43. 1 H. BLack. Rep. C.B. 357 (Exch. 1790), cited in Negus, The Negotiability of Bills
of Lading, 37 L.Q. REv. 442,455-56 (1921).
44. Id. at 359-60.
45. See Negus, stipra note 43, at 454.
46. 5Ch.D.205,217 (1877).
47. Id. at 214-15.
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on it, and the purchaser in fact transferred the document to a bank in return
for an advance with which he could have paid for the goods. From the point
of view of the seller-owner, the bank or some third party endorsee was a
necessary party to the sales transaction. It was clear that unless the purchaser
could find some way to raise money on the security of the goods, lie could not
buy the goods from the seller-owner. In the Merchant Banking case, the seller
realized that the transaction depended on the willingness of a third party
to advance money on the bill. Thus, the bill was treated as a bargain between
the seller and the third party that the risk of loss would shift to the seller when
the third party agreed to advance money to the buyer. The "dominant inten-
tion" of the original owner in this sense is the key to the court's assessment
of the relative equities of the owner and the third party good faith purchaser.
The transaction in Merchant Banking envisioned that a third party would
purchase the goods from the original buyer. But this is not the only transaction
in which this analysis has been used to imply an intent by the original seller to
sacrifice his rights to a third party. Where the seller has a carrier issue him a
negotiable bill of lading, the seller intends to sell that bill to someone, usually a
bank, in order to have his purchase price sooner than if he waited until the
buyer took delivery of the goods; the seller's dominant intent is to turn his
chattels into liquid assets which he may then re-invest, possibly in new in-
ventory. Unless a third party is willing to buy the bill of lading, the seller's
funds will be tied up during the transit period; and the third party is not willing
to advance money on the bill unless he is confident that he will be able to re-
negotiate it, which in large part rests upon his certainty that the bill represents
an indefeasible claim to the chattels. As Professor Llewellyn has stated:
... the honest merchant profits from cheap credit. As to him, the policy
question is present in these terms: whether the increase in credit facilities
afforded by protecting the banker is worth the risk of loss to him through
some dishonest agent or even thief.
48
It is important to observe, however, that the commercial demand of the finattcer
that bills of lading represent indefeasible claims to goods is only honored where
the owner of the chattels has taken the commercial risk which might promise
him some benefit from the credit facilities afforded. Where the owner's goods
48. LLEwELLYN, MATERIALS ON SALES 760n. (1930). The granting of full negotiability
to bills of lading is comparatively recent; under U.S.A. § 32, a thief could not pass
good title, but this rule was changed in the UNIFORM BxLLS OF LADING AcT § 31 by
Professor Williston, the draftsman of both Acts. Similar treatment has not been generally
afforded to warehouse receipts, though the Commissioners have recommended appropriate
amendments to the UNIFORM WAmousz REcwris AcT. See Gilmore, supra note 10, at
1079-80. The negotiable bill has "not yet been successfully adapted to use in shipments by
'truck and air, partly because of lack of terminal facilities, and partly because of the ex-
tremely short periods of transit." Id. at 1077-78. Probably because of the shorter transit
periods, perhaps because of the greater patience of the English businessman in the processes
of liquidating chattel assets, negotiable bills of lading have not been recognized by statute in
England. See Negus, The Evolution of Bills of Lading, 37 L.Q. REv. 304, 307 (1921)
Negus, snpra note 43, at 446-47; Lawson, supra note 26, at 355.
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are stolen, and the thief takes out a negotiable bill of lading which he endorses
to a holder in due course, the owner is still protected.40
This analysis is not confined to documentary transactions. Under the Uni-
form Trust Receipts Act, "title" is considered to be vested in the financer of
the chattels (usually a bank which has advanced money to a merchant to en-
able him to purchase inventory). The financer's special status as "owner" of
the chattels, however, is lost when the merchant sells the goods to a purchaser
in the due course of trade. The financer only has an action for the proceeds
of the sale.50 But the financer "intended" to sacrifice his claim to a good faith
purchaser since the only way that the loan transaction could become a com-
mercial success is if the merchant in fact sold the goods.5 ' The comment to
section 2-403 indicates the draftsmen believed that the broadening of the "en-
trusting" doctrine would apply to situations where a financer had a security
interest in chattels which were in a merchant's possession. The comment states:
Consignors have no reason to complain [at losing their security interest
in the chattel to a good faith purchaser] nor have lendors who hold a
security interest in the inventory, since the very purpose of goods in
inventory is to be turned into cash by sale.52
Whether or not section 2-403 itself has this effect regarding the ability of a
good faith purchaser to take free from the security interest,53 it is clear that
the rule laid down in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is confirmed in the
Code, that the justification for this rule is revealed in the comment, mad that
the justification is directly related to the rationale for the negotiability of bills
of lading discussed above.
49. ... it thus appears that one who places goods in the possession of a bailee and obtains
a negotiable document therefor acquires thereby no more power to cut off out-
standing claims of ownership than he has when dealing with the goods themselves.
These two bodies of lav are identical.
Britton, supra note 42, at 115. See U.C.C. § 7-503 and comment 1, at 516. See also 2 Wn.-
LisTox § 321. U.C.C. § 2-403 broadens the circumstances in which the possessor of chattels
would be able to procure a valid negotiable bill of lading.
50. UNi'opts TRuST REcEn's AcT § 9 (2) (a) (i).
51. The trust receipt under the Act is thus restricted to the financing of goods in motion
by financing agents who do not share in the profits of the enterprise.
Gilmore, Chattel Security: 11, 57 YA E. L.J. 761, 766 (1948).
... the very purpose of allowing the dealer to have possession of the goods is to per-
mit him to sell them so that he can pay off the secured debt.... The heart and soul
of inventory security is the power of the debtor to sell free and clear to purchasers in
the ordinary course of business.
HAWmLAND, op. cit. supra note 27, at 107.
52. U.C.C. § 2-403, comment 2, at 198.
53. It seems unlikely that Article 2, dealing with Sales Law, could take precedence in
this matter over Article 9, which deals with Secured Transactions. Thus for the Code law
concerning transactions previously covered by the UNiFosm TRusr RzcEms Acr § 9-307
(1) should be consulted; this Section in fact continues the rules in the UTRA relying on
the notion of purchase in the "ordinary course of business" to free the chattel from the
security interest. Interview with Professor Grant Gilmore, Yale Law School, New Haven,
Connecticut, March 25,1963.
19631 1215
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The policy underlying the old entrusting for purposes of sale doctrine is
similar. Where an owner entrusts his chattels to an agent for the purpose of
sale, the success of the transaction from the owner's point of view depends on
the agent selling the chattels and the owner receiving the proceeds. Thus the
courts were willing to give a good faith purchaser from the agent indefeasible
title and leave the owner with his action against the agent for the proceeds
from the sale. But where a seller entrusts his chattels for some purpose other
than a sale, it was not his intent that the chattels be translated into money. Thus
he was not held to have sacrificed his rights as against a good faith purchaser."
It is dear, then, that in common law analysis the owner's intent to sacrifice
his claims to the commercial demand that goods be freely negotiable is as-
certained by asking these questions: What kind of risk did the owner voluntar-
ily take in dealing with his chattel? What kind of benefit did he hope to gain?
Was the participation of a stranger to the original transaction a necessary ele-
ment in the owner's calculation of the possibilities of gain? The courts have
asked these questions in assessing the negotiability of chattels generally, and
these questions lie at the heart of the cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines.
In both situations the doctrines favor the original owner's claims as against the
good faith purchaser because the original owner intended to take virtually no
risk in dealing with his chattel.
Critics of these doctrines have not acknowledged that the courts, whether
deciding in favor of the original owner or in favor of the good faith purchaser,
were following a coherent analytic scheme. Rather, they appear transfixed by
the formulae incanted by the courts r without realizing that a broader analysis
underlies the assertive dicta. They have delighted in exposing application of
the "dominant intent" principle as a pious fraud,"0 calling it "meaningless and
54. Professor Llewellyn'regards this doctrine as a misreading of the Factors Acts.
Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARv. L. R v. 873, 900 (1939). He sees
the policy of the Acts as originally based on the fact that mercantile agents most frequently
acted as financers for the owner of goods; that is, the owner would ship the goods to the
factor who immediately would advance credit to the owner based on anticipated proceeds of
the sale, or of future sales regarding future shipments. Thus, in his view, all goods in the
factor's possession were regarded by the mercantile community as security for loans made
to the owner, and whether or not the goods were entrusted for the immediate purpose of
sale was irrelevant. Id. at 897-98. Llewellyn's reading of the purpose of the Factors Acts and
his conclusion that all goods in a factor's possession should be taken by a good faith pur-
chaser free from the owner's claim is also derived from the notion that the benefits the
owner hopes to gain must be related to the risks the courts will view him as taking; the
difference between the courts and Professor Llewellyn is not based on policy, but on the
factual basis for application of agreed policy.
55. See Vou, SALES 175-78 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as VOLD) for an analysis
of the various conclusionary labels the courts purport to use as guiding rules in applying
the cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines.
56. It is submitted that the search for intention has been a misdirected one. To realize
how universal this search has been the reader only need turn to the quotations in any
collection of cases. The text writers have fallen in line with this theory.
Levin, The Intention Fallacy in the Construction of Title Retaining Contracts, 24 Micil. L.
R.v. 130, 137 (1925). See Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Sin:iltalleo us"
and Conflicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 115-16 (1950) ; Note, The "Cash Sale"
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unworkable," a particularly dangerous "legal fiction" since it gives "no clue on
cursory examination to the content of the more vital doctrines which [it]
cloaks."15 7 At first glance the intent principle as applied to cash sales or lar-
cenous tricks does appear absurd. No seller intends to do business with an in-
solvent or fraudulent purchaser. But the critics have wrongly conceived of the
"dominant intent" principle, applying it to the single transaction isolated from
the general commercial setting in which the transaction takes place. Of course
in any single transaction it is "meaningless and unworkable" to say that the
owner of a chattel intends to lose it. But neither businessmen nor courts think
in terms of isolated transactions. It is common business practice to take a cal-
culated risk of loss in order to maximize the possibilities for greater gain. And
it is this kind of calculated risk that the courts see a businessman taking when
he enters a transaction using a negotiable instrument, or when he delivers his
chattels to a factor for purposes of sale, or when he gives credit on stock in
inventdry. Where the risk of loss actually materializes, such as when a fraudu-
lent agent or thief disrupts a particular transaction, it is not meaningless to say
that the businessman intended to incur the loss; he hoped for gain, and he will-
ingly ran the risk of loss. And the gain that he sought must necessarily have
come from the willingness of third parties, as credit agencies or as purchasers,
to deal with the goods. Where such third party has in fact taken the goods,
where the businessman's commercial gambit is successful in attracting the third
party, there is no reason why he should be entitled to withdraw merely because
this particular transaction turns out to be unfavorable to him.
The cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines can be explained by this
analysis of commercial practice. The similarity and interrelated policies of the
two doctrines can be seen in the "dominant intent" test as applied to determine
whether a defrauded seller willingly parted with the chattel or whether the
chattel was taken from him by a larcenous trick (in the parlance, whether the
imposter received a "voidable" title which gives an indefeasible claim to a
subsequent good faith purchaser or whether he received a "void" title which
can pass no claim at all). Essentially, as the courts have viewed it, a larcenous
trick is an impersonation designed to give a false appearance of respectability
and solvency, and the courts ask, "Did the seller intend to deal with the im-
poster so that a good faith purchaser from the imposter receives indefeasible
title, or did the seller intend to deal only with the man whom the imposter
represented so that the seller may retake the chattel from the good faith pur-
chaser ?"58
Presumption in Bad Check Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly, 62 YALEn LJ. 101 (1952);
Corman, Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAD. L Rv.
55, 60-61 (1956).
57. Abel, supra note 11, at 231-33.
58. Various attempts have been made to reduce the larcenous trick doctrine to a
series of pat formulae. It has occasionally been stated that where the parties deal face-to-face
there can be no larceny by a trick because-the seller always intends to deal with the imposter.
See Short & Walls Lumber Co. v. Blome, 45 Del. 397, 75 A.2d 234 (1950); Edmunds v.
Merchants' Despatch Trans. Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883). See also Note, 4 MxiNr. L. REv. 460
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If we narrow our view to the isolated transaction in question, the seller's
intent seems no test at all. When a man represents himself as X, a wealthy
merchant, it is axiomatic that, if the seller knew X were really Y, the seller
would not wish to complete the transaction, and this would be true even if Y
were himself a wealthy merchant; the seller would be suspicious and no one
intends to deal with a man who impersonates someone else.
But the intent test does have a functional value because in a normal com-
mercial transaction involving the transfer of chattels, the seller doesn't really
care who X is.5 9 Because the transaction is an impersonal one, the seller is
not really deceived when he sells to an imposter. The larceny by a trick doc-
trine does not apply, and the seller may not recover the chattel from a good
faith purchaser. It may be assumed that the seller prefers to deal with an
honest purchaser. And there is one sure way that the seller can find out
whether his purchaser is honest: he can check and double-check the pur-
chaser's references, he can wait until the purchaser produces information to
substantiate a credit standing. Where a seller does take this trouble, the
courts will generally hold that he intended to deal with the person represented
(1920) ; Note, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 749 (1926) ; Note, 26 CoLum. L. REv. 636 (1926) ; Com-
ment, The Imposter and the Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 526 (1937). But there are cases which,
in spite of the face-to-face dealings between the parties, hold that there was larceny by a
trick and that no title passed. Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y. Supp. 518
(1925) ; Damis v. Barcia, 266 App. Div. 698, 40 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1943) ; Frye & Co. v. Bolt-
man, 182 Wash. 447, 47 P.2d 839 (1935) ; Gustafson v. Equitable Loan Ass'n, 186 Minn.
236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932); Lake v. Simmons [1927] A.C. 487; Ingram v. Little (1960] 3
Weekly L.R. 504 (C.A.).
The "rule" is also frequently stated that where the imposter falsely represents himself
to be the agent of another person, the transaction is always void since the seller intended to
deal only with the non-existent principal. See Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Trans,
Co., 135 Mass. 283 (1883); Cohen v. Savoy Restaurant, 189 N.Y. Supp. 71 (Sup. Ct.
1921) ; Brotchiner & Sons v. Ullman, 141 Misc. 102, 252 N.Y. Supp. 244 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
But, again, there are cases where the fact that the imposter calls himself an agent has been
conveniently overlooked. See White v. Pike, 240 Iowa 596, 36 N.W. 2d 761 (1949) ; Chip-
lock v. Steuart Motor Co., 91 A.2d 851 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1952) ; King's Norton Metal
Co. v. Edridge [1897] 14 T.L.R. 98 (C.A.).
And there are cases which state, as a virtually irrebuttable presumption, that where the
parties enter into the transaction by mail, the seller intends only to deal with the person
represented and not with the imposter. See Cundy v. Lindsay (1878) 3 App. Cas. 459. But
there are mail transaction cases where the title has been held to pass. See Icing's Norton
Metal Co. v. Edridge [1897] 14 T.L.R. 98 (C.A.). Significantly, this "rule" has been held
inapplicable to mail transactions involving a fraudulent payee of a negotiable instrument.
The court's perception of the inescapably commercial implications of dealing with the in-
strument is the key to this presumption concerning the maker's "intent." See Abel, supra
note 11, at 223-24.
59. See Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917) ; Cundy v. Lindsay
(1878) 3 App. Cas. 459.
The Commissioners justified the abolition of the larceny by a trick doctrine in the Code
in this way:
Such extension of the concept of theft to include trick, particular types of fraud and
the like is for the purpose of helping conviction of the offender; it has no proper
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and not with the imposter, and that the seller is thus protected as against a
good faith purchaser from the imposter.r° But this commercial policy of as-
certaining the true identity of every customer has its price in terms of slowing
down every sales transaction. Where the seller is predominantly concerned
with high sales volume, he will be less worried about checking every pur-
chaser's identity. Working on the assumption that most purchasers are honest,
this seller is willing to accept the risk of occasional loss in order to keep his
merchandise moving. And the courts will not protect this seller; there will
be no larceny by a trick.61
application to the long-standing policy of civil protection of buyers from persons
guilty of such trick or fraud.
U.C.C. § 2-403, comment 2, at 126.
But, ironically enough, the larcenous trick doctrine has long been criticized as making
little sense in the context of the criminal law. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv.
L. Rsv. 457, 469-70 (1897). And any fraudulent taking, whether amounting to "larceny by
a trick" or not, is now criminal by statute in virtually all jurisdictions. Muxn, CnR=mL
LAw 382 (1934). In fact, the doctrine was in its inception commercially oriented. See id. at
174. Rather than punish all intentional misrepresentations in sales contracts as larcenous
taking of property, the judges attempted to delimit larceny situations from genuine com-
mercial transactions where the fraud was related to a risk voluntarily assumed by the com-
plaining party. The attempt to differentiate criminal from commercial misconduct can
be seen in these excerpts:
This was not a case of payment made on an honest contract for the sale of goods,
which eventually may, from some cause, not be delivered ....
The Queen v. Russett [1892] 2 Q.B. 312, 315 (larceny conviction sustained).
It was a sale; and the property as well as the possession was entirely parted with.
The prisoner has defrauded the prosecutor of the price of the horse, but not of the
horse itself; and the only remedy the prosecutor has is by action to recover the
eight pounds [which he had paid]; but the prisoner cannot be indicted for a felony.
The King v. Harvey, 1 Leach 467-68, 168 Eng. Rep. 335-36 (1787).
Thus where the purchaser is induced to pay much more for a chattel than it was in fact
worth, the seller cannot be charged with larcenous taking of the purchase price, The Queen
v. Wilson and Martin, 8 C. & P. 111, 173 Eng. Rep. 420 (1837), or where the seller of a
chattel is induced to give credit on a false promise to pay, there is no larceny, The King
v. Harvey, supra; Lewer v. Commonwealth, 15 S & R 93 (Penna.), cited in Commonwealth
v. Dehle, 42 Pa. Super. 300, 305 (1910). And it follows that there is larceny by a trick
only where there is no genuine commercial transaction entered between the parties.
60. Damis v. Barcia, 266 App. Div. 698, 40 N.Y.S2d 107 (1943); M. Brotchiner &
Sons v. M. Ullman, Inc., 141 Misc. 102, 252 N.Y. Supp. 244 (Sup. CL 1931) ; Richardson
v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 38 Wash. 2d 314, 229 P.2d 341 (1951) ; Ingram v. Little [19601
3 Weekly LR. 504 (C. A.) ; Lake v. Simmons [1927] A.C. 487.
61. Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917) ; Industrial Bank of Com-
merce v. Packard Yonkers Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Note, in the Packard
Yonkers case, that, in a narrow sense, the seller's intent to deal with the person represented
by the imposter could not have been dearer since the conditional sales contract was regis-
tered under the fictitious name; but the court used the Phelps v. McQuade formula to in-
validate the effects of the registration, 279 App. Div. 125, 108 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1951), aff'd
nem., 304 N.Y. 622, 107 N.E.2d 96 (1952). See also Phillips v. Brooks, Ltd. [1919] 2 K.B.
243 (CA.); King's Norton Metal Co. v. Edridge, Merrett & Co. (1897) 14 T.L.R. 98
(C.A.).
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The rationale of the cash sale doctrine is the same.0 2 Where a seller in-
sists on full cash payment as a prerequisite to any delivery of chattels, it is
inescapable that his sales volume will suffer. It is the credit seller who takes
a calculated risk that the rapid turnover of merchandise made possible by his
liberal policy will offset any losses which he might incur from the occasional
fraudulent purchaser,63 just as the seller who takes out a negotiable bill of
lading is willing to incur the risk of loss because of the possibility of greater
gain. The credit seller has much to gain from the free flow of goods; the
more readily people are willing to purchase the more easily he can cover his
risks. The effective and unimpeded functioning of the commercial market is
essential to his success. It is therefore not inequitable to sacrifice his claims in
particular chattels to encourage freer purchase generally. On the other hand,
the necessary implication of the cash seller's conduct is that if no one meets
his exacting conditions of sale, he is willing to keep his goods indefinitely. The
cash seller-has only a remote interest in a high volume of sales throughout
the commercial market, and he does not see it to his benefit to foster purchase
generally. Concomitantly, the cash seller will be less able to withstand particu-
lar losses through fraud than the high volume credit seller. The cash seller does
not intend to take the risk of loss in dealing with his chattels, and his claims
are thus protected against the good faith purchaser.
62. The court in Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469, 212 N.Y. Supp. 518, 521 (1925)
distinguished Phelps v. McQuade, 220 N.Y. 232, 115 N.E. 441 (1917)-the leading American
imposter case--on the grounds that "in that case goods were delivered on credit." See note
64 infra and accompanying text.
63. See I-Land Auto Sales, Inc. v. Valle, 12 Misc. 2d 1091, 175 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1958), where the purchaser's giving a stolen car as payment, when cash was
demanded, was held not to defeat the good faith purchaser's claim because, inter alia, of the
"haste on the part of the plaintiff [seller] to make the deal . . ."; Island Trading Co. v.
Berg Bros., 209 App. Div. 63, 204 N.Y. Supp. 523 (1924), where the court strained to find
a credit sale based on the general character of the seller's business, in spite of clear con-
tractual language indicating a cash sale, aff'd on other grounds, 239 N.Y. 229, 146 N.E.
345 (1924) ; Crescent Chevrolet Co. v. Lewis, 230 Iowa 1074, 300 N.W. 260 (1941), where
the court states flatly that the transaction was a cash sale but then holds that the seller
was "estopped" from retaking the chattel from a good faith purchaser because the seller
knew that his purchaser intended to re-sell the chattel to raise the purchase money, and it
was clear that this was a customary mode of business for this seller.
Unfortunately this view of the proper mode by which the dominant intent of the parties
is ascertained where a good faith purchaser asserts a claim to the chattels was not followed
by American or English courts in the important field of consumer financing. In America the
inelegant notion that the seller could voluntarily deliver possession yet retain title was used
to protect large-scale consumer financers from losing their claims to chattels sold by
fraudulent purchasers. See 2 WILLISTON § 324. In England, the title-retaining contract of
sale was rightly regarded as a contradiction in terms. See SALE OF GooDs Acr § 25 (2),
56 & 57 Vict. Ch. 71 (1893) ; Lawson, The Passing of Property and Risk in Sale of Goods,
65 L.Q. REv. 352, 354 (1949). But the same effect was permitted by viewing a credit pur-
chaser as a bailee or lessee of the goods so that title remained in the bailor who was thus
protected against good faith purchasers. See ATiYAH, THE SALE OF GOODS 4-5 (1957). But
if ever a seller can be identified who gains greatest benefit from high volume of sales and
an "unimpeded flow of goods in commerce" and who, at the same time, views fraudulent
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As the above statement of the rationale of the two doctrines indicates,
the doctrines are 'directly related, and are in fact often used as alternative
grounds for the same decision." In both, the fraud of the first purchaser is the
essential element which voids the transaction and operates to protect the
original owner; it would be senseless to distinguish between a fraud that the
buyer was agent for a non-existent person, that the buyer represented him-
self as a non-existent person, and that the buyer was writing a check on a
non-existent account. Depending on the exact nature of the fraud practiced by
the buyer and the expectations of the seller, presumptions of proof concern-
ing the validity of the transaction shift. Nevertheless, a policy that one kind
of fraud can in some circumstances void the transaction, while another kind
of fraud can in no circumstances have the same effect, is difficult to justify. Pro-
fessor Gilmore, however, has argued that, unlike the larceny by a trick doc-
trine, the cash sale doctrine does not operate to deprive a good faith purchaser
of the chattel; he sees cash sale as a device by which courts have favored the
original owner only where the good faith of the ultimate purchaser is doubtful
or where the purchaser is a mere pledgee or lien creditor of the fraudulent
party.6 5 It is true that the case law is far from clear that a good faith pur-
chaser's title is void where the seller parted with his chattel in a cash sale ;f"
but there are cases which so hold,67 and the text-writers are explicit that in
some circumstances the good faith purchaser will lose.0s The case law is sparse,
it is submitted, because the technical cash sale is a rare occurrence in com-
mercial transactions, just as larceny by a trick is, on proper analysis, restricted
to unusual situations.
and insolvent purchasers as an everyday risk in his commercial transactions, that seller
would be the consumer credit dealer. The obvious inequities in depriving the good faith
purchaser where his seller held the chattel only under a "conditional sale" prompted, in
virtually every state, the passage of registratiork statutes. See note 29 supra. But, as Pro-
fessor Gilmore has pointed out, title registration. in such transactions is commercially un-
realistic; the duped good faith purchaser cannot be expected to think about searching title
before buying the chattel. Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 784 (1943).
Regarding consumer finance, the courts' application of the "dominant intent" doctrine
has done commercial law a disservice; the credit seller's lawyers are careful to make the
seller's intent to retain title leap up from the documents of sale and the courts have been
blinded by their own language.
64. Snyder v. Lincorh 150 Neb. 580, 35 N.WV.2d 483 (1948) ; Gustafson v. Equitable
Loan Ass'n, 186 Mfinn. 236, 243 N.W. 106 (1932) ; Amols v. Bernstein, 214 App. Div. 469,
212 N.Y. Supp. 518 (1925).
65. Gilmore, supra note 10, at 1061-62.
66. Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F. Supp. 317 (D. Neb. 1950); Sullivan Co. v. Larson, 149
Neb. 97, 30 N.W.2d 460 (1948). Cf. Annot., Seller's Rights in Respect of the Property, or
Its Proceeds, upon Dishonor of Draft or Check for Purchase Price, on a Cash Sale, 31
A.L.R. 578, 581 (1924).
67. Slaton v. Lamb, 260 Ala. 494, 71 So. 2d 289 (1954); Handley Motor Co. v.
Wood, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d 391 (1953) ; Dobbins v. Martin Buick Co., 216 Ark. 861,
227 S.V.2d 620 (1950). Cf. De Vries v. Sig Ellison & Co., 199 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1952),
affirming 100 F. Supp. 781- (D. Minn. 1951) ; Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15,
268 S.W. 125 (1924).
68. See 2 WirasTox §§ 343, 346a; VoLD, at 172.
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As he is portrayed here, the seller who is protected by the cash sale and
larceny by a trick doctrines is a rare bird in our society. Almost every mer-
chant in fact sells on credit, and almost every merchant regards a high volume
of sales as an essential element of his commercial success. The doctrines proper-
ly apply only to the small merchant or the private seller.0 9
The comment to section 2-403 states that the cash sale and larceny by a
trick doctrines are abolished, and it appears to be generally assumed that the
section envisions opposite results from the old law in these situations. If this
is a true reading of the effect of the section, the small merchant and private seller
would be treated like the largest merchant, in response to nothing more than an
abstract notion of the demands of the commercial market. 0 Such a policy seems
unwarranted. It is doubtful that the transactions protected by the cash sale
and larceny by a trick doctrines represent a significantly larger number than
those transactions involving stolen chattels where the Uniform Commercial
Code continues to protect the owner who has taken no voluntary risk. It might
even be argued that those who own chattels which are attractive to thieves
are better able to withstand the financial loss than the small merchant or pri-
vate seller who loses his chattels to a fraud.
Moreover, under the old doctrines the financial loss tended to fall on the good
faith purchaser-merchant rather than the ultimate purchaser-consumer. Where
the original owner could retake his goods from the good faith purchaser-con-
sumer, the purchaser in turn would have his action on breach of warranty of
title against his seller.7 ' Or, similarly, the original owner would have an ac-
69. The ingenious distinction between "no title" . . . (therefore true owner prevails
over good faith purchaser) and "voidable title" .. . (therefore true owner loses to
good faith purchaser) made it possible to throw the risk on the true owner in the
typical commercial situation while protecting him in the non-commercial one. Since
the law purported to be a deduction from basic premises, logic prevailed in some de-
tails to the detriment of mercantile need but on the whole voidable title proved a useful
touchstone.
Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1060 (1954).
See, e.g., concerning larceny by a trick, Richardson v. Seattle-First Nat. Bank, 38
Wash. 2d 314, 229 P.2d 341 (1951) ; Ingram v. Little [1960] 3 Weekly L.R. 504 (C.A.),
With reference to "cash sales," Void states,
The clearest illustration is the common case of sale of goods for cash over the
counter in a retail shop... In Professor Williston's classic treatise on Sales, sales
made by shopkeepers over the counter furnish the only class of cases that is treated
as completely free from doubt.
VOLD, SALEs 169 & n.57 (1st ed. 1931). See also VOLD, SALS 161-63 (2d cd. 1959).
70. Members of legislatures are asked to enact this proposed statute. One may wonder
whether such members .. . actually grasp and share this very broad outlook toward
increasing the negotiability of goods.
Does this shift of risk or burden at the property owner's expense help toward maxi-
mum fulfillment of human wants? Does it do so with minimum frustration of other
human wants? For convincing answers to that basic question definite data here seems
urgently needed. Earnestly asserted self-serving arguments based on unproved as-
sumptions ... are here no real proof one way or the other.
VOLD, SAtrs 183-84 (2d ed. 1959).
71. U.C.C. § 2-312; U.S.A. § 13.
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tion in conversion against the merchant who sold in good faith to the pur-
chaser-consumer.7 2 And where this good faith middleman was reputable, he
would be in a position to satisfy either judgment. Thus, of anyone in this
triangle-the small merchant who lost the goods, the merchant who pur-
chased the goods from the cheat intending a resale, and the ultimate purchaser
-the loss would fall on the person customarily dealing in transactions of this
kind, the merchant who might be expected to adjust his prices to cover this
risk of loss in his general dealings with the public. Where the purchaser-
consumer is not able to recover from his seller, because his seller as in
fact the fraudulent third party or is now insolvent, we do have two "inno-
cent parties"--the original owner and the good faith purchaser-one of whom
must suffer; but the demands of the commercial marketplace do not in-
eluctably tell us to favor a purchaser who deals with a seller of questionable
repute. In fact, a purchaser can protect himself by dealing with well-established
merchants; a small seller, even taking all the care that he can in selecting
customers, can only deal with those who choose to come to him.
The cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines reveal a definite bias
toward the rights of ownership in chattels. Those who argue that chattels
should be freely negotiable, as under French law, regard them essentially as
articles of commerce. But chattels, unlike negotiable instruments, are both
objects of commerce and objects of intrinsic use.73 And there is no self-evident
reason why chattels should be treated by the law more as one than as the other.
Where a good faith purchaser is a merchant dealing with the chattel as an
object of commerce, he may reasonably expect to lose it as part of the risks
of his trade. And where the purchaser wanted the chattel as an object of
ownership, it is not unrealistic to assert that he would rather have the lav
protect his ownership of chattels generally than to keep this particular chattel
which the original owner never intended to lose.
It is not dear, however, that the effect of section 2-403 must be to reverse
the results reached under the old doctrines. The same substantive results may
be effected by the courts through manipulation of the notion of good faith.
Presumptive rules may be established so that a purchaser from any seller of a
certain type will be considered to have taken the chattel subject to prior claims;
a purchaser might be given the exalted status of good faith only when he has
bought the chattel from an established merchant. Where the original owner is
a small merchant or private seller, it is likely that a fraudulent purchaser from
him will not be an established merchant; thus, given the presumptive rule, no
purchaser from that fraudulent purchaser could take the chattel in good faith.
It may not be necessary, however, for the courts to rely on a conclusionary
manipulation of the good faith doctrine. It may be that the policy insight re-
72. See, e.g., De Vries v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 199 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1952); United
States v. Kerr Gifford & Co., 136 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ida. 1956).
73. Goods.. . lead a double life: as inventory, they are the subject matter of com-
mercial transactions; as possessions, the things we live by, they have passed out of the
stream of commerce and come to rest.
Gilmore, m-pra note 69, at 1057.
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vealed by the old doctrines can be expressly relied on as the true basis of
decision. This possibility is presented because some kinds of mistake may still
operate under section 2-403 to void the contract of sale so that no title passes to
a good faith purchaser. Take this example: A sells B a purse for $1.00 which,
unknown to them both, contains a valuable jewel. In some circumstances this
contract of sale would be held void for fundamental mistake. Since 2-403 (1)
does not purport to cover this situation, the original owner may retake the
jewel even from a good faith purchaser.
Yet there is no analytic difference between the fundamental mistake doctrine
and the cash sale and larceny by a trick doctrines. In each case, the courts
speak in terms of the intent of the parties in entering the transaction, and the
seller is arguing that he never agreed to the terms of the contract of sale whici
later were revealed to be the ones actually presented.74 In each case, the
isolated "intent" of the parties at the moment of entering the transaction yields
no answer; to determine "dominant intent" the courts place the transaction in
the context of the relative commercial positions of the parties, and ascertain
the expectations of the parties which naturally arise from their relative
positions.7"
Thus, regarding the fundamental mistake doctrine in the sale of the purse-
with-jewel, if the seller were a dealer in purses and had set his price at the
true commercial value of a purse-without-jewel, his "dominant intent" would
74. See note 3 supra.
75. This is Corbin's analysis of the context within which the mistake doctrine operates
both at common law and equity. For example, he states:
When a contractual promise is aleatory in character, the performance being ex-
pressly made conditional upon an uncertain and hazardous event, the promisee beta
that it will happen and the promisor that it will not.... [T]he opinion of one of them
as to probability is ... erroneous; but his mistake is not ground for rescission, be-
cause he consciously assumed the risk.
3 COR1IN § 598, at 584-85.
See, e.g., Callisher v. Bischoffsheim (1870) L.R. 5 Q.13. 449, where the parties entered
a settlement agreement on the mistaken assumption that legal action could be brought on
the basis of prior transactions, and the contract was upheld. The relative economic position
of the contracting parties and the expectations as to assumption of risk that thereby naturally
arise are also the most intelligible way to distinguish MeRae v. Commonwealth Disposals
Commission, 84 Commw. L.R. 377 [Austl. 1951], where salvage rights in a non-existent ship
were sold by a Government agency and the contract was held to be validly entered (See 3
Co1rBN § 600, at 604 n.33) from the leading case of Couturier v. Hastie (1856) 5 I-I.L.C.
673, where the contract was held void because the merchandise sold did not exist at the
time of the sale.
Compare Oscar Chess, Ltd. v. Williams (1956) 1 Weekly L.R. 370 (C.A.), where a
dealer bought a used car from a private seller on the mutual assumption that the car was
a 1948 model; in fact, it was a 1939 model, but the contract was upheld, with a French case,
Rotil v. Balas, [1933] Dalloz Jurisprudence II, 25, where an antique dealer purchased a
table from a private seller on the mutual assumption that the table was Louis Quinze; in fact,
it was a later imitation and the sale was held void for mistake. The French doctrine of
mistake is much more literalist than the common law doctrine. See Lawson, Error vi
Substantia, 52 L. Q. REv. 79,98 (1936).
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be to retain the jewel, and there would be no sale."0 If the seller is a dealer in
second-hand goods across the counter, his "dominant intent" is to give wind-
falls to the purchaser, since the purse in this situation has only a speculative
commercial significance to both parties.77 In both cases, the seller, if asked at
the moment of sale, would declare that he intended to sell only a purse. The
speculative character of the sale in the latter situation can only be gleaned
from an appreciation of the broad commercial outlines of the relations between
the parties. And this is precisely the mode in which the courts have used the
"dominant intent" test in the situations doctrinally labelled cash sale and
larceny by a trick. Indeed, the results reached under the cash sale and
larceny by a trick doctrines can as easily be expressed in terms of funda-
mental mistake. Thus, for example, where a seller receives a bad check from
an impersonator in a cash sale, the transaction can be considered void because
there was a larceny by a trick, or because there was a technical cash sale with-
out payment of cash, or because there was a fundamental mistake.
The determination of such operative fundamental mistake rests on the
analysis of the owner-seller's "dominant intent" which has been discussed
above; only the small merchant and the private seller would have the protec-
tion of the doctrine. If the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code in-
tended to enact a general policy that a good faith purchaser would receive in-
defeasible title whenever an owner of chattels disposed of them in what he be-
lieved to be a sales contract, there would have been no reason to leave the
76. See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887), where the de-
fendant sold a cow for $80 to a butcher on the mutual assumption that the cow was sterile;
in fact, she was pregnant, and her true market value was $750. It was held that the con-
tract was void:
... the mistake or misapprehension of the parties went to the whole substance of
the agreement..., there was no contract to sell or sale of the cow as she actually was.
The thing sold and bought had in fact no existence.
Id., at 577-78.
77. See, e.g., White v. Stelloh, 74 Wis. 435, 43 N.W. 99 (1889), where the purchaser
bought a three month old bull calf for the purposes of breeding; two years later, the calf
proved sterile. The court held that the contract was validly entered and that the purchaser
was without remedy.
Note that in a case such as this the questions run into one another whether the contract is
void for mistake or whether damages lie for breach of warranty of quality; and the existence
of a warranty of quality clearly depends on the relative economic position of the parties. See
U.C.C. § 2-314; U.S.A. § 15 (1), (2).
See also Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.V. 42 (1885), where a retail jeweler pur-
chased a stone for $1.00 from a private seller, both acting under the mistaken assumption that
the stone was of little value; in fact, the jewel was an uncut diamond worth $1,000. The seller
sought unsuccessfully to set the contract aside, both on the basis of mistake and fraud. It was
clear, however, that the dealings between the parties took place in a speculative context; the
seller testified:
I told him I had been told it was topaz, and he said it might be. He says, 'I would
buy this; would you sell it?' I told him I did not know but what I would. What
would it be worth? And he said he did not know; he .would give me a dollar and
keep it as a specimin [sic] ....
Id. at 268-69.
It is also relevant that the jeweler had never before seen an uncut diamond; the court
considered that the parties were in fact dealing from equal positions.
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general fundamental mistake doctrine untouched. But the doctrine remains
part of American sales law because the Code adheres generally to the policy
judgment that an owner must voluntarily part with his chattel in circumstances
where he accepts the risks of transferring title in order to gain possible bene-
fits before he is considered to sacrifice claims of ownership to a good faith
purchaser. And because under the Code the original owner can still reclaim his
stolen chattel from a good faith purchaser, it would make no sense to view
section 2-403 as abrogating the effects of rules which protect the original
owner in situations which, on a full appreciation of the old doctrines, are
hardly distinguishable from-theft. The section should and can be read to pre-
serve the effect, however they are designated, of the cash sale and larceny by
a trick doctrines.
Section 2-403 states that "when goods have been delivered under a transac-
tion of purchase, the purchaser has such power [to convey indefeasible title]
• . .,,8 Analytically, when a transaction is voided by fundamental mistake, in
fact there never was a contract in existence, there was no "transaction of pur-
chase." The reasoning is detailed by Mr. Justice Holmes in a leading Mas-
sachusetts case which held void a sales contract where the purchaser falsely
represented himself as agent for another. Holmes, J., stated:
The invalidity of the transaction in the case at bar does not depend upon
fraud, but upon the fact that one of the supposed parties is wanting, it
does not matter how. Fraud only becomes important, as such, when a
sale or contract is complete in its formal elements, and therefore valid
unless repudiated, but the right is claimed to rescind it. It goes to the
motives for making the contract, not to its existence; as when a vendee
expressly or impliedly represents that he is solvent and intends to pay
for the goods, when in fact he is insolvent, and has no reasonable expecta-
tion of paying for them [this envisions a credit, not a cash sale] ; or, being
identified by the senses and dealt with as the person so identified, says that
he is A when in fact he is B [this is fraud, but not larceny by a trick].
But when one of the formal constituents of a legal transaction is wanting,
there is no question of recission; the transaction is void ab initio, and
fraud does not impart to it, against the will of the defrauded party, a valid-
ity that it would not have if the want were due to innocent mistake.70
Set against this reasoning, the language of 2-403 (1) may be read to do
nothing more than re-state the old law that a purchaser may pass indefeasible
title even though he has defrauded his seller in certain ways. As Holmes states,
the fraud discussed in 2-403 (1) (a)-(d) only becomes relevant when the con-
tract was validly entered and the structure of 2-403 (1) mirrors the old law
since (a)-(d) only apply where there has been a valid "transaction of pur-
chase."80 There may still be situations where the purchaser's deception con-
cerning his identity or his solvency amounted to the absence of an essential
formal element in the contract, where there was a fundamental mistake-
whether it be labelled cash sale or larceny by a trick-which voided the entire
transaction. And in this situation, by the terms of 2-403(1), no title will pass
from the defrauder to a good faith purchaser.
78. U.C.C. § 2-403(1), quoted in text accompanying note 6 supra.
79. Rodliff v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1, 6,4 N.E. 805 (1886).
80. See U.S.A. § 24.
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